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Obscuring the Machinery of Death:
Assessing the Constitutionality of
Georgia's Lethal Injection Secrecy Law
Adam Lozeaut
Many states that still allow capital punishment have been
facing shortfalls of the drugs used in lethal injections.! American
companies have been increasingly unwilling to supply states with
these drugs in the face of public pressure and negative publicity,
and foreign pharmaceutical companies (particularly those in
nations where the death penalty is outlawed) are almost
universally unwilling to sell the drugs if they will be used to kill
prisoners.2  This shortage of lethal drugs has led to delays in
executions and states scrambling to acquire these drugs as their
stockpiles expire.' This has led to embarrassing situations for
these states, such as when, in March 2011, the federal Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA) seized a shipment of drugs intended
for the government of the state of Georgia for being illegally
imported.' In response to this drug shortage (and likely to avoid
public outcry), in March 2013, Georgia implemented a law making
the composition and origin of drugs used in lethal injections a
"state secret" and outlawing the disclosure of such information,
even to judges.'
This Note will address the constitutional and prudential
implications of such secrecy laws. These laws violate the First
Amendment, the constitutional right to due process, and
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Candidate, University of Minnesota Law School, 2015. I would like to thank Neha
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1. Ed Pilkington, US Executions Delayed by Shortage of Death Penalty Drug,
THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 28, 2010, 1:56 PM),
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shortage.
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Drugs, TIME (Aug. 7, 2013), http://nation.time.com/2013/08/07/the-hidden-hand-
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constitutional separation of powers principles. A First
Amendment violation is possible because these laws block
information vital to the determination of the nature and efficacy of
the drugs from disclosure by journalists and authorizes criminal
sanctions for doing so. A due process violation is possible because,
without knowledge of the composition and origin of the drugs used
to execute a prisoner, there is no assurance that the execution will
not be unconstitutionally lengthy or painful. Finally, the idea that
state executive officers can shield vital details about the actions of
law enforcement from judicial scrutiny implicates important
separation of powers principles. Because the imposition of capital
6 7punishment is biased on the bases of race,6 sex, and sexual
orientation," racial minorities, men, and homosexuals are more
likely to suffer the harms this law imposes if it is found to be valid.
Part I of this Note briefly describes the history of capital
punishment in America, including tracing the search for "humane"
forms of execution that comport with the requirements of the
Eighth Amendment. Part II describes the history of the death
penalty's discriminatory imposition. Part III discusses the
growing shortage of lethal injection drugs in the United States,
while Part IV describes the secrecy law that is the subject of this
Note, including the context in which it was passed and a recent
case challenging its validity. Part V argues that the secrecy law
impermissibly denies death row prisoners a meaningful
opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of their impending
executions under the Eighth Amendment. Part VI argues that the
law is also invalid because it violates essential separation of
powers principles by disallowing judicial review of certain
executive actions. Part VII argues that the law also violates the
First Amendment's guarantee of free speech by impermissibly
burdening protected speech. Finally, Part VIII presents possible
alterations to the law to save its constitutionality while still
achieving the government's interests.
6. Lumumba Akinwole Bandele, Racism and the Death Penalty: New
Evidence, EBONY (Mar. 13, 2013), http://www.ebony.com/news-views/racism-and-
the-death-penalty-new-evidence-493#axzz2NWIR4FPu.
7. Steven F. Shatz & Naomi R. Shatz, Chivalry is Not Dead: Murder, Gender,
and the Death Penalty, 27 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 64, 105-06 (2012).
8. Citing Anti-Gay Bias, ACLU Asks Governor to Spare Missouri Man Set for
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I. History of the Death Penalty in the United States
A. The Death Penalty in the Colonial and Revolutionary
Period
Execution has been used as a criminal punishment from the
very earliest days of Anglo-Saxon governance in what is today the
United States.9 The first recorded execution in the colonial United
States took place in Jamestown in 1608, when a prominent
member of the colony's leadership was executed for treason and
mutiny.'0 Though data is limited, scholars estimate that 1,578
individuals were executed in the American colonies between 1600
and 1800." Typical colonial capital laws instituted the death
penalty for a wide variety of offenses, including murder,
manslaughter, and a variety of religious offenses,12 though there is
evidence that executions for religious offenses were rare in
practice." Some colonies did institute harsher laws than others.
For instance, Virginia's 1612 "Divine, Moral, and Martial Laws"
instituted the death penalty for crimes as minor as killing
chickens and trading with Indians." Important regional
differences arose among the colonies, with the harshest capital
codes enacted by the southern colonies seeking to maintain control
9. RAYMOND PATERNOSTER ET AL., THE DEATH PENALTY: AMERICA'S
EXPERIENCE WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 5 (2008).
10. Id. Captain George Kendall was executed by firing squad, in contrast to the
standard of execution by hanging that would become typical in the years
immediately following Kendall's death. Id.
11. Id. at 8. Though this rate of roughly eight executions per year may seem
low, it is important to remember that it is estimated that the colonies' total
population was around 100,000 people until 1670, and that by 1800 the U.S.
population was still only roughly three million. Id.; see also Estimated Population
of American Colonies: 1610 to 1780, VANCOUVER ISLAND U.,
http://web.viu.caldavies/h320/population.colonies.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2014).
12. See CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 8-9 (Bryan Vila & Cynthia Morris eds., 1997) [hereinafter CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES] (describing the 1641 Capital laws of the
Massachusetts Bay Colony, imposing the death penalty for the offenses of Idolatry,
Witchcraft, Blasphemy, Murder, Manslaughter, Poisoning, Bestiality, Sodomy,
Adultery, "Man-stealing" (theft of a slave), False Witness in Capital Cases, and
Rebellion).
13. PATERNOSTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 6; see also CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN
THE UNITED STATES, supra note 12, at 2.
14. Michael H. Reggio, History of the Death Penalty, PBS FRONTLINE,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/execution/readings/history.html#fn
6 (last visited Oct. 29, 2013). Many of the most minor crimes were removed from
the capital code seven years later by Virginia's governor over fears that such harsh
laws were preventing colonists from moving to Virginia. Id.
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over the large numbers of indentured workers and slaves residing
there. 15
Colonial governments relied largely on experience and
religious scripture to justify their imposition of the death penalty.
After all, executions had been commonplace in England for a wide
variety of crimes 6 (and the colonists could even tell themselves
that their capital laws were more humane than England's, which
had a much higher number of capital offenses than most
colonies)." Colonists also used instances of support for executions
in the Christian Bible as justification for their own imposition of
the death penalty. Colonial executions were performed almost
universally by hanging," and these executions were performed
publicly. 20 While the publicly-performed nature of executions in
the colonies likely had a deterrent effect, contemporary accounts of
early public executions focused not on deterrence rationale, but
rather on retributive and religious concerns. Executions were
performed publicly to emphasize the social and spiritual
wrongness of the offender's conduct;2' thus, contrary to modern
popular conception, public executions were slow, solemn affairs.22
B. The Death Penalty in Early America
After the United States of America won its independence
from England in the Revolutionary War in 1783, the new states
continued the execution regimes they had in place during the
colonial period. The accepting attitude of the new country towards
the death penalty is demonstrated in the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution. That amendment, adopted as part of the Bill of
Rights in 1791, provides for due process in the cases of "capital"
crimes and provides that "no person shall be ... deprived of
15. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 12, at 2.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.; see also Genesis 9:6 ("Whoever sheds human blood, by humans shall
their blood be shed; for in the image of God has God made mankind."); Leviticus
24:17, 19-21 ("Anyone who takes the life of a human being is to be put to
death.... Anyone who injures their neighbor is to be injured in the same manner:
fracture for fracture, eye for eye, tooth for tooth. The one who has inflicted the
injury must suffer the same injury. Whoever kills an animal must make
restitution, but whoever kills a human being is to be put to death.").
19. PATERNOSTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 13. Roughly 96% of U.S. executions
prior to 1890 were accomplished via hanging. The remaining 4% were
accomplished via other methods, with firing squads and burning being the
predominant methods. Id.
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life . . . without due process of law."2 3 This is not to say, however,
that the transition from colonies to an independent country had no
effect on the capital punishment laws of the United States. The
capital crimes codes of most states saw a large reduction in the
number of capital crimes after the transition to statehood. This
trend was in large part the result of religious crimes being
abolished or made non-capital in the new United States, 25 but
several states also undertook independent reforms in the late 18th
century to lessen the range of crimes subject to capital
punishment. In response to arguments from prominent
statesmen such as Thomas Jefferson27 and Benjamin Rush,28
whose conceptions of criminal justice centered more on
Enlightenment ideas of proportionality and offender rehabilitation
than on retribution, in 1794 Pennsylvania became the first state to
strongly limit the imposition of the death penalty. 29 The 1794
Pennsylvania reformations introduced the concept of degrees of
murder into its criminal code and abolished the death penalty for
all crimes except first-degree (premeditated) murder.o Over the
next two decades, many other states took a similar route, limiting
31imposition of the death penalty to only the most heinous crimes.
The mid-19th century saw another important change in the
administration of the death penalty. Whereas American
executions had previously all been public affairs, the 1830s and
1840s saw executions begin to move to private state spaces, such
as the now-familiar penitentiary execution room.32 Pennsylvania
was the first state to make the shift, holding America's first non-
public execution in a prison yard in 1834.33 By 1845, every state in
New England and the mid-Atlantic region had transitioned to non-
public executions. Executions were moved to private penal
spaces largely on the belief that public executions actually
inflamed the violent passions of potential offenders, rather than
23. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
24. PATERNOSTER, supra note 9, at 9-10.
25. Id. at 10.
26. Id. at 10-11.
27. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 12, at 16-17.
28. Id. at 21 ("Murder itself is propagated by the punishment of death for
murder.").
29. Id. at 25.
30. Id. at 25-26.
31. Id. at 25.
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deterring them.35 However, many death penalty abolitionists
lamented the shift from public to private executions, believing that
the shift was intended to make the taking of human life more
palatable to civil society, thereby undermining the overall cause of
abolition.36 Death penalty abolitionists also argued that, when the
state takes the extraordinary action of taking a life, republican
ideals demand that it be done in full view of the public.37
C. The Death Penalty in 19th and 20th Century America:
The Search for Humane Methods of Killing
Another major shift in death penalty implementation that
occurred during the 19th century, and into the 20th century,
concerned the method of killing employed by the state. While
early American executions were done almost entirely by hanging,
repeated gruesome episodes caused by inexperienced local gallows
operators led state officials to search for more humane (or at least
more humane-seeming) methods of execution." In 1888, New York
City introduced a new way of executing prisoners intended to be
more humane than hanging-the electric chair.3 9 This hope of a
humane execution method was undermined, however, at the
state's very first execution by electrocution, when the initial
attempt to kill the prisoner by a seventeen-second jolt of electricity
failed.4o Attending doctors found a pulse and a heartbeat, and the
chair was turned back on until "the smell of burnt flesh filled the
35. Id. at 33. The pseudo-science of phrenology, en vogue during the mid-
1800s, contributed greatly to this idea. Phrenologists believed that some people
had overdeveloped "destructive" brain regions that responded with delight to
executions, encouraging them to commit their own acts of violence. Id. at 33-34.
36. Id. at 34.
37. Id. at 50-51 (quoting Thomas C. Upham: "a great anomaly this in a
republican government! Our courts of justice must be open to the public; the
deliberations of our legislatures must be public ... but when life is to be taken,
when a human being is to be smitten down like an ox, when a soul is to be violently
hurled into eternity, the most solemn occasion that can be witnessed on earth, then
the public must be excluded.. . . If business of this nature is done at all, it must be
done in the light of day. . . .").
38. See PATERNOSTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 13-15. Botched hangings
commonly failed to break the prisoner's neck, resulting in a slow death by
strangulation over the course of twenty to thirty minutes, accompanied by the
gasping and choking of the dying individual. Id. at 14. Less commonly, the
executed individual's head snapped completely off. Id.
39. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 12, at 68. Before
introducing the electric chair, New York considered executing prisoners via a lethal
injection, but this possibility was rejected when New York's medical community
expressed strong opposition to the use of a medical instrument to cause death.
PATERNOSTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 15-16.
40. PATERNOSTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 19.
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execution room" and the prisoner was dead." Nonetheless, many
states rushed to implement this "modern" form of execution, and
from 1930 to 1967, at least 60% of executions in the United States
were performed via electric chair.4 ' Despite the electric chair's
widespread use, some states, reacting to the often gruesome
results of botched electrocutions, instituted a new, "humane"
method of execution in the 1920s-the gas chamber." Nevada was
the first state to adopt lethal gas as its method of execution, and
by 1955, ten states had adopted its use, with over 30% of
executions performed via lethal gas between 1960 to 1969."
Despite its framing as a humane method of execution, however,
witnesses to executions via lethal gas reported the executed
individual spasming, seizing, and turning purple before death
occurred within a few minutes.
States finally decided to address the easily botched and
obviously painful methods of execution they used in the 1980s and
1990s through the introduction of lethal injection. In 1977,
Oklahoma became the first state to allow, by statute, the use of
lethal injection as a method of execution, justifying the legislation
both by the humaneness of lethal injection and by the expense of
fixing the state's malfunctioning electric chair. Oklahoma sought
assistance from the Oklahoma Medical Association in developing
its lethal injection protocol, but the Association refused due to
ethical concerns." As a result, Oklahoma's lethal injection
protocol was developed by the state's medical examiner and a
professor at the University of Oklahoma's medical school." These
professionals recommended the administration of three drugs-
41. Id.
42. Id. at 32-33 & Figure 2.6.
43. See id. at 33-34.
44. Id. at 34-35.
45. Id. at 34.
46. See id. at 56-57. In 1983, the state of Alabama took fourteen minutes to
electrocute John Louis Evans to death, with flames surging from the electrodes
connected to his leg. Id. at 56. In the same year, the state of Mississippi put
Jimmy Lee Gray to death with lethal gas; his death took at least eight minutes and
was accompanied by Gray moaning, gasping, and banging his head against a pole
in the gas chamber while convulsing. Id.
47. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, So LONG AS THEY DIE: LETHAL INJECTIONS IN
THE UNITED STATES 10 & n.6 (2006), available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/us0406/3.htm. Texas passed lethal injection
legislation the next day. Id. at 10.
48. Id. at 13-14.
49. See id. at 14-15; see also Deborah W. Denno, When Legislatures Delegate
Death: The Troubling Paradox Behind State Uses of Electrocution and Lethal
Injection and What it Says About Us, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 63, 95-96 (2002) (describing
the development of lethal injection in Oklahoma in more detail).
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sodium thiopental (an anesthetic intended to put the prisoner to
sleep), pancuronium bromide (a muscle relaxer intended to stop
the prisoner's breathing), and potassium chloride (a drug that
induces cardiac arrest).5 0 An identical three-drug procedure was
adopted by Texas, the first state to actually carry out a lethal
injection,5 ' and significantly, many other states' correctional
departments have candidly admitted to simply copying the lethal
injection procedures utilized by early adopting states like
Oklahoma and Texas rather than consulting with medical experts
to develop their own protocols." Thus, the three-drug protocol
became ubiquitous." By 2006, thirty-seven of the thirty-eight
death penalty states had lethal injection statutes.
Once again, however, states came to realize that their newly-
adopted method of execution was not quite as humane as they may
have hoped. Often, prison medical technicians have a difficult
time finding a usable vein on the prisoner, subjecting him to
multiple incisions and a lengthy execution process." Also, the
combination of the first and third drugs in the typical protocol is
troublesome: the "fast-acting" nature of sodium thiopental
increases the risk that the anesthetic will wear off and the
prisoner will regain consciousness during the dying process,56 and
potassium chloride causes excruciating pain if administered to
conscious individuals.17 Prisoners subject to lethal injection do not
typically exhibit distress; however, this is a result of the
administration of pancuronium bromide, which causes total
50. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 47, at 21; Denno, supra note 49 at 97-
98.
51. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 47, at 15-16; see also CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 12, at 283 (indicating Texas first
used lethal injection in 1982).
52. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 47, at 11-13.
53. See id. at 11 ("Despite the variations in state statutory language
authorizing lethal injections, thirty-six state corrections agencies today use the
same three-drug sequence of sodium thiopental, pancuronium bromide and
potassium chloride in their lethal injection drug protocols.").
54. Id. at 10.
55. PATERNOSTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 57 (describing an instance where it
took about thirty-nine minutes for medical technicians to find a useable vein, and
another that took thirty-three minutes for medical technicians to find a second
useable vein); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 47, at 30-36 (describing
the lethal injection procedure and training of the execution team).
56. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 47, at 36-38 (describing the
problems by a lack of a trained-in anesthesiologist during lethal injection); Denno,
supra note 49, at 118 n.378 (referring to sodium thiopental as "fast-acting").
57. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 47, at 22 ("While potassium chloride
acts quickly, it is excruciatingly painful if administered without proper
anesthesia.").
458 [Vol. 32:451
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paralysis in the prisoner." Even an individual suffering intensely
would be unable to show signs of distress, and studies have
suggested that a high percentage of inmates put to death via
lethal injection may have regained consciousness at some point
during the process.5
Many death penalty reformers have argued that the second
and third drugs in the lethal injection protocol are unnecessary
and that a lethal dose of an anesthetic would be sufficient to cause
death and avoid the risks of intense pain presented by the
introduction of the second and third drugs in the protocol.0 To
date, thirteen states have adopted a one-drug protocol, utilizing a
lethal dose of an anesthetic (either sodium thiopental or
pentobarbital).61
II. The Death Penalty in the United States: A Long Story of
Discrimination
Throughout the history of its use, the death penalty has been
applied on a discriminatory basis. Since the earliest days of
America, racial minorities and men have been subject to
disproportionate death sentences, and evidence indicates that
sexual orientation has also been a factor in determining whether
an individual will be sentenced to death.
The history of racial bias in the imposition of the death
penalty is as clear as it is long. For instance, colonial governments
58. See Denno, supra note 49, at 100 ("[Plancuronium bromide serves no real
purpose other than to keep the inmate still while potassium chloride kills [him or
her.").
59. PATERNOSTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 57-58 (citing a study of 49 executed
prisoners performed by the University of Miami Medical School and published in
The Lancet indicating that, at the time of death, 88% of the prisoners had
anesthetic levels below that required for surgery and almost 43% of the prisoners
were likely conscious at the time of death).
60. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 47, at 21-28 (describing the
limitations of the three-drug protocol). Additionally, many anti-death penalty
advocates argue that not only would the removal of pancuronium bromide and
potassium chloride from lethal injection protocols decrease the risk of the prisoner
suffering intense pain, the removal of pancuronium bromide would serve
transparency interests by allowing execution witnesses to more readily ascertain
whether the execution truly was humane, rather than whether it only seemed
humane due to the prisoner's inability to express pain and distress. See Denno,
supra note 49, at 100 ("[W]hen potassium chloride is used as an additional third
chemical, pancuronium bromide serves no real purpose other than to keep the
inmate still while potassium chloride kills. Therefore, pancuronium bromide
creates the serene appearance that witnesses often describe of a lethal injection
execution, because the inmate is totally paralyzed.").
61. State by State Lethal Injection, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-lethal-injection (last updated Feb. 22, 2014).
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in the 17th century enacted many capital laws applicable only to
slaves,12 and many southern states had laws on the books until the
passage of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 that made the
death penalty available for Blacks but not Whites who committed
the same crime.63 Statistical evidence shows that racial minorities
have been disproportionately given death sentences during all eras
of American history. From 1608 through 1929, 51% of all executed
individuals were Black;" during that time period, Blacks never
made up more than 22% of the population, and usually
significantly less.6" From 1930 through 1967, 50% of all executed
individuals were Black, and during that same time period 89% of
the death sentences given for rape were given to Blacks and non-
Whites.66  The 1987 Supreme Court decision in McCleskey v.
Kemp 67 refused to recognize that Georgia's execution regime was
racially biased, and declined to hold that any individual had acted
with discriminatory intent. 8 Recently, a study of Harris County,
Texas prosecutions demonstrated that prosecutors were three
times as likely to seek the death penalty against Black defendants
as they were against Whites.6 ' The evidence for race being a
critical factor in the death sentence determination is not solely
statistically based. In the 1984 South Carolina case of Earl
Matthews, the prosecutor argued for capital punishment for a
Black man convicted of murder partially because he attributed the
state's high crime rate to the "moral dissolution" of the state's
Black community.o
While there is a clear bias against Black defendants in the
imposition of capital punishment, there is an equally clear bias in
favor of White victims. Evidence from North Carolina in the 1930s
and 1940s indicates this bias was at work: while 69% of Black-on-
White killings resulted in a capital charge, only 53% of Black-on-
62. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 12, at 2.
63. See id. at 65 ("[Although the states made a token effort to comply with the
[Fourteenth} Amendment by taking criminal statutes that punished [Bilacks more
harshly than [Wihites off their books[,] ... [ilt wasn't until more than a century
after its adoption that the Fourteenth Amendment ... became important in a
number of legal challenges to existing capital sentencing procedures.").
64. PATERNOSTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 9 & Figure 1.2.
65. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED
STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, at 9, 1168 (Bicentennial ed. 1975).
66. PATERNOSTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 185, Figures 8.1, 8.2 (noting that at
that time, Blacks only made up about 12 to 15% of the population).
67. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
6& Id. at 297-99, 313.
69. Bandele, supra note 6.
70. PATERNOSTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 210-11.
[Vol. 32:451460
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Black killings did so." Studies examining sentencing trends in the
late 1970s to 1990s also demonstrate that a defendant was
significantly more likely to be sentenced to death if he killed a
White victim than if he killed a non-White victim.7 2 The
aforementioned Earl Matthews case also provides explicit evidence
of victim-race bias; a former employer of the prosecutor's office
testified at trial that one of the prosecutors said that Matthews'
case deserved less prosecutorial attention because the victim was
"just a little old [BIlack man."73
The death penalty is also applied disproportionately on the
basis of sex; specifically, men are much more likely to be sentenced
to death than are women. From 1608 to 1929, over 96% of all
individuals executed were men, and many of the executions of
women came during the colonial period for religious offenses such
as witchcraft.7 ' From 1977 through 2005, 99% of those executed
were men.7" However, these extremely high percentages may be a
bit misleading, since the vast majority of murders are committed
by men.76 Even taking men's higher murder rate into account,
however, the death penalty is applied disproportionately. In the
United States generally, men commit roughly 90% of murders
while receiving roughly 98% of death sentences. Recent studies
have shown that, in California, women commit roughly 5% of
death-penalty-eligible crimes, but receive only 1.2% of death
sentences."
As in the case of racial bias, sex bias can also be seen from
the perspective of the sex of the victim. For instance, in a study of
California capital cases, a death sentence was imposed in 10.9% of
cases where a woman was the sole victim and only in 1.5% of cases
71. Id. at 188 & Figure 8.1.
72. See id. at 206-07 (referencing one Maryland study and one California study
which both found that those who killed White victims were more likely to be
sentenced to death). The racial disparities in the imposition of the death penalty
arise at both the charging and sentencing stages of the trial. See id. at 199-204
(describing studies of prosecutorial decisions from various states).
73. Id. at 210-11.
74. Id. at 10 & Figure 1.3.
75. Id. at 47 (stating only eleven women have been sentenced to death since
1977).
76. See, e.g., Rob Barry et al., Murder in America, WALL ST. J.,
http://projects.wsj.com/murderdata/#view=all (last visited Mar. 2, 2014) (showing
that of all solved homicides in the United States except Florida between 2000 and
2010, about 10% were committed by women, while 90% were committed by men).
See also id. (indicating that of all murders in the United States except Florida
between 2000 and 2010, in 26% of cases the sex of the killer was unknown).
77. See PATERNOSTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 208 & Box 8.2.
78. Shatz & Shatz, supra note 7, at 106.
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where a man was the sole victim." One reason for this disparity is
that rape-murders have a higher rate of death sentences than
other murders; even controlling for this factor, however,
defendants are sentenced to death at a rate nearly three times
greater when their victims were female rather than male.so
Finally, a defendant's sexual orientation may be relevant to
whether a death sentence is imposed. While there are no
comprehensive studies that prove the death penalty is applied
disproportionately to homosexuals (likely due to a lack of sufficient
information), in several cases a defendant's homosexuality was
used to argue that imposition of the death penalty was
appropriate. In 1985, Stanley Lingar was sentenced to death
largely on the testimony of a co-conspirator; the prosecution was
allowed to offer Lingar's homosexuality as an aggravating
"character flaw" that justified imposition of the death penalty."
That same year, Calvin Burdine was sentenced to death; Burdine's
counsel did not even object when the Texas prosecutor made
several offensive references to Burdine's homosexuality, including
the implication that life in prison was not an adequate
punishment for Burdine since he would enjoy being raped in
prison.82  Though no studies definitively prove that the death
penalty is disproportionately applied to homosexuals, trial
evidence makes clear that sexual orientation has been one factor
79. Id. at 107; see also id. at 108-09 (presenting several studies with similar
findings and arguing that such disparity results from "chivalrous" legal ideas that
present women as weaker and more in need of protection than men). Traditional
Anglo-American ideals of chivalry and patriarchy may also be responsible for the
disparity apparent in imposition of the death penalty between male and female
offenders; prosecutors and juries may be more likely to view even female violent
criminals as needing protection, and thus be less likely to impose a harsh bodily
punishment on them. See id. at 106. This inference is bolstered by the fact that
women who are given death sentences are more likely to not fit "traditional"
notions of femininity (either because of their status as a prostitute, homosexual, or
woman of color or because their crime involves a crime against a child). Id.
80. See id. at 108 ("When rape-murders are excluded from consideration, the
death-sentence rate in the current study for female victim cases is 4.9% compared
to 1.5% in male victim cases.").
81. Citing Anti-Gay Bias, supra note 8; see also Richard Goldstein, Queer on
Death Row, VILLAGE VOICE, Mar. 13, 2001, http://www.villagevoice.com/2001-03-
13/news/queer-on-death-row/ (discussing same case).
82. See PATERNOSTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 235; Press Release, Am. Civ.
Liberties Union, Slated Release of Gay Texas Inmate Further Reveals Death
Penalty's Injustice, Merits Statewide Moratorium (Mar. 2, 2000)
(https://www.aclu.org/lgbt-rights.hiv-aids/slated-release-gay-texas-inmate-further-
reveals-death-penaltys-injustice-merits). During a later hearing regarding the
effectiveness of his representation, the man who served as Burdine's counsel
himself used offensive terms to refer to homosexuals. PATERNOSTER ET AL., supra
note 9, at 235.
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that prosecutors and juries consider in the imposition of the death
penalty.
III. States' Decreased Access to Lethal Injection Drugs
As discussed above, lethal injection is by far the most
common form of execution used in the United States today, and
almost all states utilizing lethal injection use a three-drug protocol
where an anesthetic (either pentobarbital or sodium thiopental) is
administered at the outset to make the prisoner lose
consciousness.8 ' Thirteen states have abandoned the three-drug
protocol in favor of a one-drug protocol that causes death solely by
administering a lethal dose of anesthetic.' However, perhaps the
greatest threat to the viability of these execution protocols, and
thus to the implementation of the death penalty in these states, is
the rapidly decreasing availability of anesthetic drugs to state
correctional departments.
In 2010, Hospira, an Illinois-based company and the sole
manufacturer of sodium thiopental, suspended its production of
the drug due to shortages of an ingredient necessary to make the
drug." This suspension of production led to shortages of the drug
83. State by State Lethal Injection, supra note 61.
84. Id. Eight states have actually used the single-drug protocol, while five have
announced their intention to do so. Id. Ohio's protocol, until recently, called for a
lethal dose of a single drug (pentobarbital). Josh Voorhees, Did Ohio's New Lethal-
Injection Cocktail Lead to a Cruel and Unusual Death for Dennis McGuire?, SLATE
(Jan. 16, 2014), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the-slatest/2014/01/16/dennis-mcguire
execution did ohio s new lethal injection cocktaillead to.html. However, in
response to a shortage of pentobarbital, Ohio used an untested two-drug
combination of mydozolam and hydrocodone to execute Dennis McGuire. Id. This
drug combination was described by a federal judge as an "experiment in lethal
injection processes" and McGuire's lawyers claimed it was likely to cause painful
and terrifying "air hunger." Id. Many witnesses to the execution, including
journalists and priests, reported that McGuire did seem to be in intense distress
during the twenty-four minutes it took McGuire to die. Id; Lawrence Hummer, I
Witnessed Ohio's Execution of Dennis McGuire. What I Saw Was Inhumane, THE
GUARDIAN, Jan. 22, 2014,
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jan/22/ohio-mcguire-execution-
untested-lethal-injection-inhumane; see also Prison Guards Say Executed Man
Faked Symptoms of Suffocation During 'Agonizing' Death From New Drug After
Being Coached by Lawyer, DAILY MAIL ONLINE (Jan. 28, 2014),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2547177/Prison-guards-say-executed-man-
coached-attorney-fake-symptoms-suffocation-long-horrific-death.html. Prison
guards claim that McGuire told them his attorney had coached him to "make a
show of his death," but that he refused to do so. Id. McGuire's attorney's office
investigated, denied the charge, and reiterated that McGuire was unconscious
during most of his execution (which took longer to complete than any execution
since Ohio re-instituted the death penalty). Id.
85. Pilkington, supra note 1. Some death penalty advocates have expressed
doubt at the existence of the supply shortage, insinuating that the alleged shortage
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in many states where it was used in executions, leading in turn to
execution delays in those states.86 The shortage was exacerbated
by federal laws strictly regulating the importation of sodium
thiopental,8 and by United Kingdom and European Union actions
prohibiting British and European companies from supplying the
drug to the United States for use in executions." In January 2011,
Hospira decided to stop making sodium thiopental permanently
after a bid to begin manufacturing the drug in Italy stalled
because the Italian government forbade its use in executions and
implied that the drug-maker could be held liable if any of its
89product ended up being used for that purpose.
In response to the sodium thiopental shortage, many states
changed their lethal injection protocols to allow for the use of
pentobarbital, a different anesthetic, in place of sodium
thiopental."o However, the American company that manufactured
pentobarbital was purchased in 2009 by the Danish drug-maker
Lundbeck," and, partially in response to pressure from European
anti-death penalty groups, Lundbeck sought to end the drug's use
in U.S. executions. 92 In January 2011, when sodium thiopental
became unavailable, Lundbeck sent letters to the governors and
correctional departments in sixteen states telling them it did not
want its drugs used to kill prisoners.93 When this request went
unheeded, Lundbeck took other measures to ensure its drugs
would not be used in executions." The company began refusing
was in fact a pretext for Hospira to suspend manufacture of the drug. Hospira had
previously made statements condemning the drug's use in executions, and the
drug's sales constituted a very small percentage of Hospira's total income. Id.
86. Id.
87. John Schwartz, Seeking Execution Drug, States Cut Legal Corners, N.Y.
TIMEs (Apr. 13, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/14/us/
14lethal.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&.
88. Sanburn, supra note 2.
89. Chris McGreal, Lethal Injection Drug Production Ends in the US, THE
GUARDIAN (Jan. 23, 2011), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/23/lethal-
injection-sodium-thiopental-hospira.
90. See Pam Belluck, What's in a Lethal Injection 'Cocktail'?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
9, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/10/weekinreview/lOinjection.html.
91. Timothy Bella, New Lethal-Injection Drugs Raise New Health, Oversight
Questions, AM. ALJAZEERA (Oct. 14, 2013),
http://america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/america-tonightlamerica-tonight-
blog/2013/10/14/new-lethal-injectiondrugsraisenewhealthoversightquestions.html.
92. Sanburn, supra note 2.
93. Kimberly Leonard, Lethal Injection Drug Access Could Put Executions on
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orders from U.S. prisons and altered its contracts with distributors
to prevent them from reselling the drug."
Such refusals by pharmaceutical companies to sell drugs for
use in U.S. executions left many death penalty states scrambling
to replace stocks of drugs that had expired or were about to expire.
For instance, Georgia's stock of pentobarbital expired in March
2013;96 Ohio's supply of pentobarbital expired in September 2013;9'
and the pentobarbital supply of Texas, by far the nation's leader in
lethal injections, expired in September 2013.98 These expirations
and shortages have led several states to take extraordinary
measures to ensure access to the drugs they use to kill prisoners.
Some states engaged in a legally questionable drug-swapping
scheme to ensure they had enough lethal injection drugs to meet
their needs.9 Others hastily switched their drug protocols to use
widely available anesthetics despite the fact such drugs had never
before been administered in executions.'" Other states' actions
were even more egregious. For instance, in 2010 the state of
Georgia, in contravention of federal law, imported sodium
thiopental from a secondary drug distributor operating out of the
back of a driving school in London, England."o' In response,
federal DEA agents raided the maximum-security prison where
the drugs were stored and seized the illegally imported supply. 02
Also in 2010, the state of Nebraska undertook two different
illegal schemes to obtain sodium thiopental. First, it illegally
95. See David Jolly, Danish Company Blocks Sale of Drug for U.S. Executions,
N.Y. TiMES (July 1, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/02/world/europe/02execute.html.
96. Ed Pilkington, Georgia Scrambles for Fresh Supply of Drugs to Execute
Death Row Inmate, THE GUARDIAN (July 12, 2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/12/georgia-drugs-execute-death-row-
inmate.
97. See Ohio Prisons Add 2nd Lethal Injection Drug Option, Keep Pentobarbital
Despite Supply Expiring, FOXNEWS.COM (Oct. 4, 2013),
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2013/10/04/ohio-prisons-add-2nd-lethal-injection-drug-
option-keep-pentobarbital-despite/.
98. Sanburn, supra note 2.
99. Schwartz, supra note 87 (describing a sodium thiopental swapping scheme
involving Arkansas, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Texas).
100. See Jim Salter, Missouri Gov. Halts First US Execution by Propofol, WASH.
POST (Oct. 11, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/missouri-gov-halts-
First-us-execution-by-propofol/2013/10/11/559e6af6-32d9-11e3-8627-
c5d7deOaO46b story.html. Missouri had intended to switch the anesthetic used in
its executions to propofol, a drug manufactured in Germany and the most widely-
used anesthetic in American hospitals. Id. However, Missouri's governor halted
the first execution intended to use propofol after a European Union threat to limit
the drug's export to the United States generally if it were used in executions. Id.
101. Segura, supra note 4.
102. Id.
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bought the drug through an Indian manufacturer's American
agent, who was promptly fired by the manufacturer upon its
learning of the improper sale."13 The DEA later invalidated this
sale." Nebraska later bought a different supply of the same drug
from the same agent, who this time obtained the drug by telling a
Swiss company he wanted samples to supply to patients in
Zambia; the agent, though, turned around and sold the samples to
Nebraska.O' Finally, many states have turned to compounding
pharmacies to provide the anesthetics used in lethal injections. 106
While compounding pharmacies do not raise the same concerns
about illegal importation, compounding pharmacies are not subject
to FDA regulation, and therefore, the quality of drugs
manufactured at compounding pharmacies cannot be assured."1' A
grim example of this lack of quality control occurred in the fall of
2012, when a compounding pharmacy in Massachusetts shipped
over 17,000 vials of steroids contaminated with fungus, leading to
a meningitis outbreak that killed 48 people and sickened over
700.1"
103. Brian Evans, The Shady World of Execution Drug Trafficking, AMNESTY




105. Anjali Puri, Hawking Poison, OUTLOOK INDIA (Dec. 5, 2011),
http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?279072. The pharmaceutical company,
Naari, demanded that Nebraska return the fraudulently obtained drugs. Id.
Nebraska, however, like any addict who searched high and low to get a fix, was not
about to give up its drugs so easily. See Kevin O'Hanlon, Federal Court Says
Nebraska, Other States Can Keep Lethal Injection Drug, LINCOLN J. STAR (July 23,
2013), http://journalstar.com/news/state-and-regional/nebraska/federal-court-says-
nebraska-other-states-can-keep-lethal-injection/articlef4334851-eba7-5027-bc68-
606e7c7024a7.html. The state was able to keep the drugs after a court found that
the FDA could not retroactively order the drugs seized, though it could expressly
bar future importations of the drug. Id.
106. Molly Hennessy-Fiske, Texas Turns to Pharmacy for Custom-Made
Execution Drug, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2013),
http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-texas-execution-
20131010,0,3264275.story#axzz2j5cRhOqm.
107. See Andrew Pollack, Checks Find Unsafe Practices at Compounding
Pharmacies, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/12/health/unsafe-practices-found-at-compounding-
pharmacies.html?_r-0.
108. Scott Pelley, Lethal Medicine Linked to Meningitis Outbreak, 60 MINUTES
(Mar. 10, 2013, 7:01 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18560_162-
57573470/lethal-medicine-linked-to-meningitis-outbreak/. The compounding
pharmacy that shipped the contaminated drugs was later shown to have known of
over eighty instances of fungal and bacterial contamination on its premises,
including in supposedly sterile "clean rooms." Lena H. Sun, Compounding
Pharmacy Linked to Meningitis Outbreak Knew of Mold, Bacteria Contamination,
WASH. POST (Oct. 26, 2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-10-
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IV. Implementation of and Challenges to Lethal Drug
Supplier Secrecy Laws
In response to these recent shortages of lethal injection
drugs, several states have taken action to attempt to ensure future
access to such drugs. In early 2013, Arkansas, South Dakota, and
Tennessee amended their states' public records laws to shield the
identities of the suppliers of lethal injection drugs from disclosure
under their public records acts.'" A law enacted in March 2013 in
Georgia went even further. The law, known as the "Lethal
Injection Secrecy Act," states:
The identifying information of any person or entity who
participates in or administers the execution of a death
sentence and the identifying information of any person or
entity that manufactures, supplies, compounds, or prescribes
the drugs, medical supplies, or medical equipment utilized in
the execution of a death sentence shall be confidential and
shall not be subject to disclosure under Article 4 of Chapter 18
of Title 50 or under judicial process. Such information shall be
classified as a confidential state secret."o
The bill's sponsor, Republican Representative Kevin Tanner,
said the law was necessary to shield those who participate in
lethal injections from "harassment and threats.""'
The law did not stand long, though, before a state judge ruled
the law invalid under both the federal Constitution and the
Georgia State Constitution." 2  On July 15, 2013, lawyers for
Warren Lee Hill, a cognitively disabled man scheduled to die by
lethal injection that day, filed an emergency motion to enjoin Hill's
execution." 3  Hill's lawyers argued that, though the state had
informed Hill that pentobarbital would be used to execute him, the
lack of disclosure of any other information about the drug or its
source created a constitutionally impermissible risk of serious pain
26/national/35501834_1_fda-report-meningitis-outbreak-methylprednisolone-
acetate. There is no evidence the company took any measures to address this
contamination prior to the meningitis outbreak. Id.
109. Raymond Bonner, A Prolonged Stay: The Reason Behind the Slow Pace of
Executions, FACING SOUTH, http://www.southernstudies.org/2Ol3/05/a-prolonged-
stay-the-reason-behind-the-slow-pace-o.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2014).
110. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-5-36(d)(2) (West 2013).
111. Rhonda Cook & Bill Rankin, Lethal Injection Secrecy Bill Wins Approval,
ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Mar. 26, 2013), http://www.ajc.com/news/news/state-regional-
govt-politics/lethal-injection-secrecy-bill-wins-approval/nW4tK/.
112. Andrew Cohen, New 'Injection Secrecy' Law Threatens First Amendment
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and prolonged death.114 The presiding judge delayed the execution,
and just three days later, found the law unconstitutional under the
Eighth Amendment of the federal Constitution and under the
Separation of Powers Clause of the Georgia State Constitution."
The stay of execution is in effect until the Georgia Supreme Court
rules on the constitutionality of the law.11 6
V. Georgia's Lethal Injection Secrecy Law Violates
Prisoners' Due Process Right of Access to the Courts by
Withholding Information Essential to a Constitutional
Claim
The Eighth Amendment to the federal Constitution prohibits
the government from inflicting "cruel and unusual punishment"
upon those convicted of crimes." Despite the fact that corporal
punishments, once common in colonial and early American days,
have been abandoned as unnecessarily cruel,"' the Supreme Court
has never ruled that the death penalty per se constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment."9
However, the Court has also stated that the determination that a
punishment is "cruel and unusual" is not a fixed, formal one, but
rather a determination that should be made in accordance with
"evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society. "120
114. See id.
115. See Andrew Cohen, How Georgia Just Spared the Life of a Man it
Desperately Wants to Kill, THE ATLANTIC (July 19, 2013),
http://www.theatlantic.com/nationallarchive/2013/07/how-georgia-just-spared-the-
life-of-a-man-it-desperately-wants-to-kill/277971/.
116. David Schick, Warren Hill Case Rejected by U.S. Supreme Court, FLAGPOLE
MAGAZINE (Oct. 7, 2013, 4:19 PM), http://flagpole.com/blogs/in-the-
loop/posts/warren-hill-case-rejected-by-u-s-supreme-court. The Georgia Supreme
Court heard oral arguments on the secrecy law's validity on February 17, 2014.
Bill Rankin, State's Lethal Injection Secrecy Law Challenged, ATLANTA J.-CONST.
(Feb. 17, 2014), http://www.ajc.com/news/news/states-lethal-injection-secrecy-law-
challenged/ndRc2/.
117. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
118. See John D. Bessler, Tinkering Around the Edges: The Supreme Court's
Death Penalty Jurisprudence, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1913, 1916 n.27 (2012)
(describing the 19th century abolition of corporal punishments such as whipping,
branding, cropping of ears, and standing in stocks).
119. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 256-57 (1972) (holding that the death
penalty violated the Eighth Amendment as then applied due to its arbitrary and
capricious imposition); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976) (holding that the
development of procedural safeguards against arbitrary death penalty imposition
remedied constitutional infirmities).
120. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). This test has resulted in the Court
finding some particular types of executions once deemed acceptable to violate the
Eighth Amendment, such as executions imposed upon the mentally "retarded,"
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The Supreme Court's most recent explication of the
constitutionality of the death penalty (and of lethal injection in
particular) came in Baze v. Rees, where the Court upheld the
constitutionality of Kentucky's use of the common three-drug
protocol in lethal injection executions.1 2 1 In that case, the Court
recognized that the actual infliction of suffering is not necessary
for a state to violate the Eighth Amendment; rather, the Court
said, "subjecting individuals to a risk of future harm ... can
qualify as cruel and unusual punishment."1" However, the Baze
Court also stated that a punishment violates the Eighth
Amendment only if it presents a "substantial risk of serious harm"
and further described this standard as being violated only when
there exists "an objectively intolerable risk of harm that prevents
prison officials from pleading that they were subjectively
blameless."123 The prisoners' argument was premised largely on
the idea that the state's three-drug protocol violated the Eighth
Amendment because of an impermissible risk the anesthetic would
be improperly applied, resulting in consciousness at the time of
painful death by administration of the third drug." However, the
Court stated that "[slome risk of pain is inherent in any method of
execution-no matter how humane-if only from the prospect of
error in following the required procedure" and held that
Kentucky's execution protocol included enough procedural
safeguards to render it constitutionally permissible.125
Baze's analysis focuses mainly on the qualifications and
training of prison personnel assigned to perform executions. In
Baze, both parties agreed that an execution "performed properly"
under Kentucky's protocol would be "humane and
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), and executions imposed for non-lethal
rapes, Coker v. Georgia, 533 U.S. 584 (1977).
121. 553 U.S. 35 (2008).
122. Id. at 49 (emphasis added).
123. Id. at 50 (internal quotation marks omitted). This analysis, holding that
the Eighth Amendment is only violated in situations where prison officials can
reasonably be seen as being subjectively blameworthy, echoes the Court's Eighth
Amendment analysis in McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), where the Court
held that though ample evidence had been presented that the death penalty was
administered in a racially discriminatory way statewide, the prisoner was unable to
demonstrate that discrimination was the cause of the imposition of the death
penalty in his particular case, and thus his Equal Protection claim failed. Id. at
319.
124. See Baze, 553 U.S. at 54.
125. Such safeguards include a requirement of professional training for IV team
members, a requirement that IV team members participate in execution "practice
sessions" and the presence of execution observers to monitor signs of consciousness.
Id. at 54-56.
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constitutional,"126 and the Court found Kentucky's procedural
safeguards to be sufficient to ensure the execution would be
properly performed."7 However, the Court (and prisoners) in Baze
took for granted that the drugs used in Kentucky's executions
were properly manufactured."8 Without disclosure of the source of
the drugs used in executions, this is not an assumption a court can
reasonably make. As more states move towards obtaining lethal
injection drugs from largely unregulated compounding
pharmacies,12 courts should consider that drugs created by
compounding pharmacies contain significant risks that drugs
created by traditional manufacturers do not.' Compounding
pharmacies are exempt from critical aspects of pharmaceutical
regulation, including regulations meant to ensure safe and high-
quality manufacturing practices.' This lack of regulation does
not lead to merely speculative harms; such a lack of oversight
leads to drugs created by compounding pharmacies to occasionally
126. Id. at 49.
127. Id. at 56.
128. In fact, the Court's entire analysis that the protocol does not present a
significant risk of harm is premised on its finding that the anesthetic drug is likely
to be properly administered, and that because of such proper administration the
drug (assumed to be of high quality) will perform its function of fully anesthetizing
the prisoner: "at the outset, it is important to reemphasize that a proper dose of
thiopental obviates the concern that a prisoner will not be sufficiently sedated." Id.
at 59.
129. Missouri, Texas, and South Dakota have all either executed or plan to
execute inmates using compounded drugs, and other states, facing lethal injection
drug shortages, plan to do the same. Emily Levy, The Choking of America's
Executioners, VOCATIV (Nov. 7, 2013, 8:50 AM), http://www.vocativ.com/11-
2013/choking-americas-executioners/.
130. Compounding pharmacies create small amounts of drugs, typically to
provide customized drugs to patients who cannot take the mass-produced version of
the drug, due to a difference in needed dosage, allergies, or other reasons. Jacque
Wilson, Meningitis Outbreak: What is a Compounding Pharmacy, CNN (Oct. 11,
2012, 3:24 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/11/health/compounding-pharmacies-
explainer/. However, recently compounding pharmacies have begun producing
larger quantities of drugs for wide distribution, leading to problems like the
meningitis outbreak described below. Id.
131. Levy, supra note 129. In late 2013, President Obama signed into law a bill
instituting a regulatory scheme under which compounding pharmacies can
voluntarily register to be subject to FDA inspection. Obama Signs Bill Regulating
Compounding Pharmacies, NBC NEWS (Nov. 27, 2013),
http://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/obama-signs-bill-regulating-
compounding-pharmacies-f2D11665035. Proponents of the law hope this voluntary
regulatory scheme will work if doctors and hospitals agree only to work with FDA-
registered pharmacies. Id. Because of the voluntary nature of the scheme, though,
this law does not allay the Eighth Amendment problems presented by the
unregulated character of compounding pharmacies. Any compounding pharmacy
can choose to remain unregulated, and correctional departments are free to
continue obtaining drugs from such pharmacies. See id.
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be non-sterile and contaminated with dust, fungus, or allergens,
which can lead to unintended illnesses, extremely painful
reactions, and a lack of potency.12 For instance, an October 2012
report commissioned by Congressman Edward Markey concluded
that, not counting the fungal meningitis outbreak attributed to the
New England Compounding Center ("NECC"), contaminated drugs
made by compounding pharmacies were responsible for at least
twenty-three deaths and eighty-six illnesses over the prior
decade.' This risk of harm was clearly seen in the execution
context in South Dakota's October 2012 execution of Eric Roberts.
Roberts was put to death using a compounded dose of
pentobarbital. 34  During the execution, Roberts opened his eyes
and appeared to choke-both signs he was potentially conscious
during his death. " An examination of the compounded drugs
later revealed that they were contaminated with fungus. 136 The
realities of the lack of oversight and the far-too-common
contamination of drugs created by compounding pharmacies
demonstrate the possibility that drugs from compounding
pharmacies generally create a constitutionally impermissible risk
of serious harm. If compounding pharmacies are going to be used
to supply lethal injection drugs, prisoners must have the ability to
examine the track record and practices of the particular
compounding pharmacy that will be supplying the drugs used to
kill them.
However, because Georgia's lethal injection secrecy law
prohibits disclosure of the identities or even qualifications of the
companies supplying the state with lethal injection drugs, even
through judicial process, death row prisoners are expressly denied
information vital to assessing whether their execution will violate
the Eighth Amendment. Such a denial represents an effective
restriction on death row inmates' due process right to meaningful
access to the courts.
132. Pollack, supra note 107; Pelley, supra note 108.
133. THE OFFICE OF CONGRESSMAN EDWARD J. MARKEY, COMPOUNDING
PHARMACIES COMPOUNDING RISK 3 (2012), available at
http://interactive.snm.org/docs/Compounding%2OPharmacies%20-
%20Compounding%2ORisk%2OFINALO.pdf. The 48 people killed and over 700
people sickened by the NECC's drugs were not counted in the report because, at the
time of the report's publication, the full extent of the damage caused by NECC's
drugs was not known. Id.
134. Donald Campbell, South Dakota Covers Up Source of 'DIY' Death Penalty
Drugs Ahead of Execution, REPRIEVE (Oct. 30, 2012),
http://www.reprieve.org.uklpress/2012-1030 SouthDakotaexecutiondrugs/.
135. Levy, supra note 129.
136. Campbell, supra note 134.
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In Bounds v. Smith,3 7 the Supreme Court recognized that
part of the constitutional guarantee of due process 8 includes a
"fundamental right" to "adequate, effective, and meaningful"
access to the courts.'"' Part of this requirement of meaningful
access, which the Court has interpreted to impose many
affirmative obligations upon the government, 40 includes "a
reasonably adequate opportunity to present claimed violations of
fundamental constitutional rights to the courts."'4' The Supreme
Court has recognized that the constitutionality of an execution
(i.e., whether it presents an impermissible risk of serious harm)
can turn on the qualifications of the executioner.142 Thus, while
the identities of executioners have traditionally been kept secret
and not subject to disclosure laws, these identities have been
revealed in camera through the judicial process and the
executioners' testimony and qualifications have been fully
available to prisoners and their attorneys, as well as on a limited
basis to the press reporting on the case. "' There is no logical
reason that the identities of people administering drugs that will
kill should be subject to less protection than the companies who
make the drug that will kill, and denying prisoners the right to
learn the identity and qualifications of the maker of an execution
drug denies prisoners information vital to a possible constitutional
claim. A law unilaterally prohibiting disclosure of these identities
and qualifications, as Georgia's law does, thereby denies a death
row inmate meaningful access to the courts in violation of the
Constitution.
VI. Georgia's Lethal Injection Secrecy Law Violates
Constitutional Separation of Powers Principles
The Georgia lethal injection secrecy law's absolute
prohibition on revealing lethal injection drug-makers' identities
and qualifications does more than deny prisoners their right to
137. 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
138. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. V (providing that no person "shall ... be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV
(extending the Fifth Amendment's due process protections to state actions).
139. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 822.
140. Id. at 824.
141. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996).
142. See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 54-56 (2008) (holding that executioners'
training and qualifications reduced a lethal injection's risk to a constitutionally
permissible level).
143. See Ellyde Roko, Executioner Identities: Toward Recognizing a Right to
Know Who is Hiding Beneath the Hood, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2791, 2820-22 (2007).
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meaningful access to the courts. It also undermines the power of
the judiciary to review legislative and executive actions in
violation of constitutionally mandated separation of powers
principles.
The concept of separation of powers is a bedrock principle of
American republican governance. This constitutional mandate is
not explicitly stated in the Constitution, but has been inferred
from its structure since the earliest days of the United States
government.'" American separation of powers doctrine seeks to
diffuse power over three branches of government, and while the
doctrine does not prohibit the co-equal branches from interacting
or commingling functions, it does prohibit any branch from
"appropriating or intruding upon the 'core functions"' of the other
branches."' An essential feature of separation of powers doctrine
is the authority of the judicial branch to review the actions of the
legislature and executive officials, and invalidate those actions if
they are unconstitutional or otherwise illegal."' This
constitutionally mandated function of the judiciary was described
in the seminal case Marbury v. Madison,'4 7 where Chief Justice
Marshall asserted the right of the judiciary to review and
invalidate executive actions and legislation.'" While the structure
of the federal Constitution describes the separation of powers
within the federal government, separation of powers doctrine and
judicial review apply to the actions of state governments as well.4
Most state constitutions either explicitly authorize judicial review,
or do so through conspicuous implication, such as by the explicit
mandating of separation of powers.'
Georgia's lethal injection secrecy law violates core separation
of powers principles by unilaterally withholding from judicial
scrutiny important details of executive actions. Georgia's state
144. See Peter M. Shane, Interbranch Accountability in State Government and
the Constitutional Requirement of Judicial Independence, 61 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB. 21, 25-30 (1998).
145. Adrian Vermeule, The Judicial Power in the State (and Federal) Courts,
2000 SUP. CT. REV. 357, 363 (2000).
146. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177-78 (1803).
147. Id.
148. Shane, supra note 144, at 26.
149. Id. at 29 n.41.
150. Id. As Shane explains, even in states where judicial review and separation
of powers are not explicitly mandated by the state constitution, the power of the
judiciary to review legislative and executive actions can be inferred in several ways.
First, Article IV's guarantee that all state governments maintain a republican form
requires the separation of powers, whereas Article VI's Supremacy Clause and the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process clause guarantee that legislative and
executive actions are subject to constitutional review. Id. at 25.
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constitution explicitly declares that its government is organized
under separation of powers principles,' and also explicitly states
that "all laws" of the state "shall be subject to judicial decision as
to their validity."12  As such, there can be no doubt that the
Georgia Constitution assigns the judiciary the duty to review laws
for constitutionality. However, as argued above, the U.S. Supreme
Court has made clear that the qualifications of those participating
in executions raise significant Eighth Amendment concerns,"' but
the Georgia law purports to deny the judiciary any ability to hear
facts regarding the identity or qualifications of those supplying
drugs used in executions. This bald attempt by the Georgia
legislature to strip the judiciary of its power to review executive
actions violates separation of powers principles, and it is the duty
of courts to invalidate such laws.
One important argument to address in favor of the
executive's ability to shield his or her actions from scrutiny
involves the "state secrets privilege."'" As the Georgia law defines
drug-maker identities and qualifications as a "state secret," this
privilege would seem to be implicated. However, the state secrets
privilege applies in the Presidential context, allowing the
President to unilaterally withhold information with the potential
to damage "military matters," "national security," or "foreign
relations," and is not a carte blanche privilege; it must be invoked
by the President himself or herself.' Thus, the state secrets
privilege does not apply in the context of the Georgia lethal
151. GA. CONST. art. 1, § 2, para. III ("The legislative, judicial, and executive
powers shall forever remain separate and distinct").
152. GA. CONST. art. 11, § 1, para. II.
153. Supra Part V.
154. Lindsay Windsor, Is the State Secrets Privilege in the Constitution? The
Basis of the State Secrets Privilege in Inherent Executive Powers & Why Court-
Implemented Safeguards are Constitutional and Prudent, 43 GEO. J. INT'L L. 897
(2012).
155. Id. at 902-03. No state executive branch has successfully invoked a "state
secrets" privilege to shield its actions entirely from judicial scrutiny; to do so would
give a state executive agency more power to shield information than even the
federal executive branch and the President possess in the "state secrets" context.
See Louis Fisher, The State Secrets Privilege: Relying on Reynolds, 122 POL. SCl. Q.
385, 405-06 (describing the trial of Aaron Burr, where President Jefferson asserted
a privilege to keep certain letters confidential from the judiciary, but nonetheless
was required to disclose those portions "immediately and essentially applicable" to
Burr's case to in camera review); The State Secrets Privilege, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/nsa-spying/state-secrets-privilege (last
visited Dec. 2, 2013) (describing the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which
requires that even if the executive branch asserts the state secrets privilege, any
materials necessary to determine whether the government acted lawfully must be
disclosed to the court to review in camera).
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injection secrecy law, and does not justify withholding critical
information from the judicial branch.
VII. Georgia's Lethal Injection Secrecy Law Violates the
First Amendment by Impermissibly Burdening Speech
The First Amendment guarantees that "Congress shall make
no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."
While these phrases have not been interpreted to mean that all
speech is absolutely protected,15 1 the amendment does stand as a
significant bar to legislative and executive actions that seek to
punish expression. In analyzing whether a particular statute
impermissibly restricts freedom of speech, courts make a threshold
determination of whether the statute is content-based or content-
neutral.'" In Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley,'" a First
Amendment case applying content-type analysis, the Supreme
Court described the reason for analyzing content-based and
content-neutral laws under different rubrics:
[A] bove all else, the First Amendment means that government
has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its
ideas, its subject matter, or its content. To permit the
continued building of our politics and culture, and to assure
self-fulfillment for each individual, our people are guaranteed
the right to express any thought, free from government
censorship. The essence of this forbidden censorship is
content control. Any restriction on expressive activity because
of its content would completely undercut the profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.160
Because of this suspicion of laws that attempt to prohibit
speech based on its content, laws that are determined to be
content-based are subjected to "strict scrutiny" (as opposed to the
"intermediate scrutiny" to which content-neutral laws are
subjected).16' Strict scrutiny places upon the government the
156. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The free speech guarantee also applies to state
governmental action through U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
157. Several categories of speech have been found by the Supreme Court to be
unprotected by the First Amendment. These categories include incitement to
violence, obscenity, and fighting words, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 571-72 (1942), as well as malicious libel, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964), and child pornography, New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
However, statutes of the type analyzed in this Note cannot be plausibly argued to
fall within an unprotected category, and thus they will analyzed as speech
protected by the First Amendment.
15& See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
159. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
160. Id. at 95-96 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
161. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774 (2002).
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burden of proving that the challenged statute is "narrowly
tailored, to serve ... a compelling state interest."16 2 The Court has
further defined "narrowly tailored" to mean that a statute will not
survive strict scrutiny if a statute less restrictive of protected
speech would adequately serve the government's compelling
interest.163 Because content-based restrictions on speech must
survive such exacting analysis, the Supreme Court has described
content-based statutes as "presumptively invalid."1"6
Thus, in analyzing whether Georgia's lethal injection secrecy
law violates the First Amendment's Freedom of Speech clause, a
court must first determine whether the law is content-based or
content-neutral. A law is considered to be content-neutral when
the governmental interest animating the law is not "related to the
suppression of free expression."'" However, as the government is
unlikely to baldly assert the suppression of expression as an
interest justifying its law, courts must look more deeply into the
government's asserted interests to determine whether the
government's interest is related to speech suppression." For
instance, in Texas v. Johnson, where a law prohibiting desecration
of the American flag was held to impermissibly burden free
expression, the state's asserted interest in "preserving the flag as a
symbol of nationhood and national unity" was found to be related
to the suppression of expression, since the concern that a flag
burning will undermine the flag as a symbol of nationhood
162. Id. at 774-75.
163. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 329 (1988), where a District of Columbia
ordinance prohibited signs near embassies if those signs tended to bring a foreign
government into "public disrepute." The Supreme Court found the ordinance
unconstitutional due to a lack of narrow tailoring; the government's compelling
interest could have been served by a "less restrictive alternative" that proscribed
only unprotected speech like intimidation and harassment. Id; see also White, 536
U.S. at 775 ("In order for respondents to show that the [challenged provision] is
narrowly tailored, they must demonstrate that it does not unnecessarily
circumscribe protected expression.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
164. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
165. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403 (1989) (citing U.S. v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968)).
166. John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of
Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1482, 1496 (1975) ("Restrictions on free expression are rarely defended on the
ground that the state simply didn't like what the defendant was saying; reference
will generally be made to some danger beyond the message .... The reference of
O'Brien's second criterion is therefore not to the ultimate interest to which the
state is able to point, for that will always be unrelated to expression, but rather to
the causal connection the state asserts.").
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"blossom[s] only when a person's treatment of the flag
communicates some message.""
A reviewing court would likely find Georgia's lethal injection
secrecy law to be content-based, and thus would apply strict
scrutiny in its analysis. Georgia Code section 42-5-36(d) prohibits
the disclosure of "any records or information" that could be used to
identify the maker of a lethal injection drug, up to and including
the maker's "professional qualifications," and classifies such
information as a "state secret."l" The law on its face is plainly
content-based; it prohibits the dissemination of information based
on the subject-matter of that information. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that, while reasonable restraints on an
individual's manner of expression may be content-neutral, when
speech is proscribed because of its "specified content," the law is
content-based and must survive strict scrutiny. 16 9 Georgia's law
thus burdens any speaker who wishes to divulge this information.
While government employees can be kept from divulging such
classified information as a condition of employment, this law seeks
to criminalize disclosure of this information by any speaker-thus
burdening the speech of individuals who come about the
information in another capacity (an employee of the pharmacy, for
instance) and even potentially impeding the right of the press to
report this information.
A court applying strict scrutiny to the Georgia law would
likely find it to be unconstitutional. As stated above, content-
based laws are presumptively unconstitutional, and the
government bears the heavy burden of proving not only that the
law serves compelling government interests, but also that the law
is narrowly tailored to serve that interest, such that no alternative
less restrictive of speech would do so. First, the court must
determine whether the government's asserted interests are
"compelling" or merely strong or substantial; if they are anything
short of compelling, the law will not survive strict scrutiny.1 7 0
However, courts have typically been fairly deferential in making
this determination; a wide variety of government interests have
been found to be "compelling," including esoteric interests that on
their face may seem less than compelling, such as "protecting the
167. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 410.
168. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-5-36(d) (West 2013). Another section of the Georgia
Code makes divulging "any confidential state secret" as well as conspiracy to do so
a misdemeanor. § 42-9-53(c).
169. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd.,
502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991).
170. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774-75 (2002).
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dignity of foreign diplomatic personnel" 7' and "ensuring that
criminals do not profit from their crimes" by publishing memoirs
about them.172 Thus, it is likely that a reviewing court would in
fact find Georgia's asserted interests-ensuring the timely
administration of justice and protecting individuals and
corporations involved in death penalty administration from
harassment3'7 -to survive the first prong of strict scrutiny.7 1
However, the second prong of strict scrutiny is much more
difficult for the government to meet, and it is unlikely that
Georgia's law would do so. The government must show that the
regulation is "narrowly tailored" to serve the asserted interests; in
other words, that the regulation is "necessary" to serve the
interests17' and that other regulations less restrictive of protected
speech would not adequately serve the interests.176 For instance,
as to Georgia's claimed interest in assuring swift administration of
justice (used in this context to mean avoiding lengthy delays once
a prisoner is sentenced to die), Georgia could pass procedural
regulations that would fast-track death penalty appeals, could
manufacture execution drugs itself as the state of Missouri
recently began doing,'77 or could identify and develop alternative
humane means of execution that would not require the acquisition
of drugs at all.1
Georgia's claimed interest in preventing harassment of
executioners and drug-makers is a slightly closer case, as there are
fewer obvious alternatives that would be effective at preventing
harassment of executioners and drug-makers than obscuring their
identities. However, in Boos v. Barry, the Supreme Court held the
law banning signs that brought diplomats into public disrepute
171. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988).
172. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 119.
173. Order Granting Plaintiffs Emergency Motion for Preliminary Injunction at
3, 7, Hill v. Owens, No. 2013-CV-233771 (Superior Ct. of Fulton Cnty., July 18,
2013).
174. While it is very likely a court would find the state's interest in protecting
individuals who participate in executions from harassment to be compelling,
protecting pharmaceutical corporations from harassment may not rise to the level
of a "compelling" interest. However, since courts have been widely deferential as to
which interests are "compelling," this Note will assume that a court would find both
of Georgia's asserted interests to satisfy strict scrutiny's first prong.
175. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 197-98 (1992).
176. Boos, 485 U.S. at 329.
177. Levy, supra note 129.
178. Of course, these are only two examples of laws Georgia could pass to
prevent lengthy execution delays. Many others are easily imaginable, and thus
whether the lethal injection secrecy law serves this interest at all is debatable,
since a multitude of other factors contribute to lengthy execution delays.
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was not sufficiently "narrowly tailored" because the District of
Columbia could have passed a similar ordinance that banned only
unprotected speech, such as intimidation or threats."' Here, the
state of Georgia can also achieve its stated interest by burdening
only unprotected speech such as threats against executioners and
drug-makers. "
Finally, the Court has recognized that, at least in some
scenarios, the public has a First Amendment right to receive
information-a right implicated by Georgia's law. In Stanley v.
Georgia, the Supreme Court declared that the constitutional "right
to receive information and ideas . . . is fundamental to our free
society" and reversed a conviction for possession of obscene movies,
even though obscenity is unprotected by the First Amendment.""
Additionally, in Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, the Supreme Court rejected a "highly
paternalistic" law banning the advertisement of prescription drug
prices, holding that "the protection afforded [by the First
Amendment] is to the communication, to its source and to its
recipients both."'82 The Court recognized that both individuals and
society as a whole have an interest in "the free flow of commercial
information."" Finally, the Court has recognized that the press
does have (at least a limited) constitutional right of access to
criminal proceedings'" and places of punishment,i" particularly
when part of the government's motive in limiting disclosure of
179. Boos, 485 U.S. at 334.
180. It is significant that the Georgia law seeks to prevent "harassment" of those
involved with executions by suppressing constitutionally protected speech (the
disclosure of drug-maker identities), in order to prevent other constitutionally
protected speech (protest against companies whose drugs are used in executions).
While unprotected speech, such as threats, may be constitutionally proscribed, core
political speech, such as a protest against a company, may not. A foundational
principle of First Amendment doctrine is that "a principal function of free speech
under our system of government is to invite dispute," particularly on issues of
public concern. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 408 (1988) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
181. 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
182. 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976).
183. Id. at 763. The Court's analysis in this case is directly relevant to analysis
of the Georgia law, as disclosure of the names of drug-makers who supply execution
drugs may be relevant to many consumers' choices when purchasing drugs.
Though Georgia seeks to justify its law based on an interest in preventing
harassment of drug-makers if their identities are divulged, the court in Virginia
Pharmacy explicitly declared that the "choice. .. between the dangers of
suppressing information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available [is a
choice] that the First Amendment makes for us" in rejecting the law. Id. at 770.
184. See Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980).
185. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 830 (1974).
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information is an attempt to conceal wrongdoing and limit the
press' ability to investigate such wrongdoing. 186 In the particular
context of the disclosure of identities of executioners, courts have
held that even if the withholding of the identities of individual
executioners serves a compelling interest, the press must retain
the ability to examine the executioners' qualifications,s 7
something the Georgia statute expressly disallows as to both
human executioners and the makers of lethal injection drugs.
Because the Georgia law is content-based and unable to survive
strict scrutiny, a reviewing court should find that speakers do
have the right under the First Amendment to divulge the
identities and qualifications of the makers of lethal injection drugs
and should vindicate the right of the public and press to receive
such information by holding Georgia's lethal injection secrecy law
invalid under the First Amendment.
Conclusion
Through its lethal injection secrecy law, the state of Georgia
seeks to serve two important interests: ensuring the swift
application of punishments imposed by its courts, and protecting
those who implement the death penalty from harassment.'
However, the means Georgia chose to vindicate these interests-
making disclosure of the identities and qualifications of those
involved in executions a crime, and shielding such information
even from the judicial branch-are unconstitutional. The Georgia
law impermissibly denies prisoners meaningful access to the
courts by shielding from judicial scrutiny information vital to
potential Eighth Amendment claims.'89  Such shielding also
violates constitutional separation of powers principles by intruding
on courts' core functions by stripping the judiciary of its power to
review constitutional claims.'" Finally, the law also likely violates
the First Amendment's freedom of speech clause by being
insufficiently narrowly tailored to meet its ends.'
However, two changes would both save the law's
constitutionality while also serving the state's interests (not to
mention protecting the constitutional rights of death row
186. Id.
187. Roko, supra note 143, at 2821.
188. Order Granting Plaintiffs Emergency Motion for Preliminary Injunction,
supra note 173, at 7.
189. Supra Part V.
190. Supra Part VI.
191. Supra Part VII.
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prisoners). First, Georgia could alter the law so that, rather than
making divulging this information a misdemeanor, it simply
classifies the information and exempts it from public freedom of
information laws. 192 Such a change would mend the law's First
Amendment infirmities. Second, Georgia should remove the
clause stating that executioner and drug-maker information is not
discoverable through judicial process. This alteration would
satisfy the Due Process Clause and separation of powers
principles, and would allow any Eighth Amendment concerns to be
adjudicated in a court of law. Georgia's lethal injection secrecy
law violates individual liberties and core constitutional principles
in an effort to help the state mete out the ultimate punishment.
However, a few simple changes would save the law's
constitutionality and protect both the rights of the prisoners the
state seeks to execute and the vital interest the state has in
effective punishment of crime.
192. This would parallel existing valid laws exempting the identities of
individual executioners from public freedom of information laws. See Roko, supra
note 143, at 2809.
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